Tag: NotPetya

Ransomware Terrorism: Should We Be Worried?

By Marcus Chung, CEO, BoldCloud.

Marcus J. Chung
Marcus J. Chung

The threat of ransomware being used as a highly effective form of cyber terrorism has been receiving a lot of media attention lately. The story line stems from a recent Lloyds of London report that boldly states a large-scale ransomware attack could cost the global economy $193 billion and impact more than 600,000 businesses worldwide.

The report further speculates that if coordinated and executed properly, a global attack like WannaCry could cause even more severe damage and cost companies significantly more when you factor in all the business disruption and recovery related costs that would follow in the wake of a wide-scale attack.

With doomsday projections like these, it’s easy for people to become numb to the associated cyber security risks. Yet security professionals must always remain objective when assessing the scope of a threat versus the cost of implementing security measures to arrive at a risk-based recommendation.

What is ransomware terrorism?

Terrorism is broadly defined as the use or threat of violence that aims to spread fear in a population, and to advance a political, ideological or religious cause. Ransomware can be used in this context to disrupt the life of individuals and organizations, which depend on the smooth functioning of information technology to maintain operations.

While historically, the main goal of ransomware has been to extract, or extort, money or other valuable consideration from the affected party. NotPetya made us aware that there is a lot more damage an attacker could do with access to an army of computers spread across the globe than just turning them into bricks.

To prevent or avoid the consequences of an attack of terrorism, the defenders must effectively repel every single attempt to perpetrate the crime. Ultimately, the attackers only need to overcome the defenses once in any given situation to prevail.

Exploring the potential impacts of ransomware terrorism

In the proposed scenarios created by the Cyber Risk Management (CyRiM) project and Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies (CCRS), put forth in the report called, “Bashe Attack: Global infection by contagious malware,” a ransomware terrorist attack could be launched through an infected email, which once opened would be forwarded to all stored contacts.

Then within 24 hours, the malware could encrypt all data on 30 million devices worldwide. In the worst case scenario of the event, even the backups would be erased—meaning companies of all sizes would be forced to pay a ransom to decrypt their data or replace their infected devices.

It is easy to conceive that a ransomware attack on this scale would cause substantial economic damage to a wide range of business sectors through reduced productivity and consumption, inaccessible data files, IT clean-up costs, ransom payments and supply chain disruption.

The moral of the story according to Lloyds is that all businesses should pay close attention to systemic risk across all lines of business, not just within the silo of cyber and businesses should buy insurance to help protect against such catastrophic scenarios.

Continue Reading

Petya Ransomware: Hackers Learn From Their Mistakes To Create the Next Big Cyber Threat

By Jacob Denton, chief information security officer, Mosaic451.

Jacob Denton

Unless your security team has been living in a cave in one of the last remaining places on the planet where you can still unplug, you have certainly heard about the Petya and NotPetya ransomware attacks and the chaos caused by them. Petya was a somewhat “typical” ransomware attack in 2016: It encrypted the master boot record of infected computers and asked for ransom in the form of Bitcoin. But NotPetya, a potentially state-sponsored attack against Ukraine, was more similar to WannaCry, which occurred shortly before in 2017. In addition to ransoming companies to pay the hackers in Bitcoin, NotPetya also took advantage of the EternalBlue exploit and was a “worm” that could self-propagate, like WannaCry.

What made NotPetya unique was its intrusion into MeDoc, a Ukrainian tax and accounting software package. About 80 percent of Ukrainian businesses used this software at the time of the attack. The NotPetya hackers employed an innovative strategy: They put in a slightly different version of a file into MeDoc’s software updates.

Since MeDoc was so widely used throughout the Ukrainian business community, the hackers started spreading corrupted versions of MeDoc software in April. By June, undetected, they were able to insert the NotPetya ransomware. And since it was a worm, NotPetya was able to spread rapidly. It was a lot worse than Petya in its scope: It not only encrypted the master boot record, it also encrypted other important files, making the damage to companies’ hard drives even more serious.

Cyber security firm Cybereason reports that NotPetya cost companies approximately $892.5 million in lost revenue. While it first hit Ukraine, it hurt businesses worldwide, including FedEx, Merck, and Reckitt Benckiser.

What lessons have we learned?

First, that hackers have gone way past spamming naive end users. The NotPetya attack was particularly troubling because it was a “clickless” attack that didn’t need to rely on end users for access. It also took advantage of software updates, a holy grail of commonplace cyber security.

Thankfully, there are some precautions cyber professionals can heed from this hack. According to Johns Hopkins University Computer Science Professor Matthew Green, one limited action developers could do to help “prevent their software updates from being corrupted” is to “co-design.” This would mandate that anyone trying to add new code to an application would need to sign with a cryptographic key that cannot be forged. For example, MeDoc did not have co-designing, so hackers were able to alter code in the software update.

Continue Reading