Guest post by Ken Perez, vice president of healthcare policy, Omnicell.
On April 30, 2014, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services issued its proposed rule for the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS), which pays about 3,400 acute care hospitals, and the Long-term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System (LTCH PPS), which pays about 435 LTCHs.
The issuance of this proposed rule is a significant event, as it discloses CMS’s intent regarding the average change (increase or decrease) to the IPPS reimbursement rate, what one might call an “annual inflation adjustment.”
While CMS projects that the payment rate update to general acute care hospitals will be 1.3 percent in FY 2015—which on the face of it doesn’t look too bad—it’s important to understand how CMS arrived at that figure, what is the projected overall impact on hospital payments because of other regulatory changes, and how the proposed update compares with the recommendation of the nonpartisan Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).
How did CMS arrive at the 1.3 percent update (adjustment)?
CMS started with a proposed annual market basket update (inflation projection) from research firm IHS of 2.7 percent. That starting point was then reduced, per the Affordable Care Act, by a multi-factor productivity adjustment of 0.4 percent and a specified reduction to the market basket update of 0.2 percent, yielding 2.1 percent. Then CMS reduced it by a documentation and coding recoupment adjustment (basically to correct for past, unintended documentation and coding over payments) of 0.8 percent, resulting in a net update of 1.3 percent.
Guest post Ken Perez, vice president of healthcare policy, Omnicell.
“Politics is the art of the possible.” -Otto von Bismarck
This was supposed to be the year for permanent repeal of the sustainable growth rate (SGR), a formulaic approach intended to restrain the growth of Medicare spending on physician services. There was the rare cosmic convergence of bipartisan and bicameral support for SGR reform proposals at the end of 2013, and cost estimates by the Congressional Budget Office of a long-term “doc fix” reached new lows earlier this year.
But those hopes were dashed, as permanent SGR reform bills from both sides of the aisle died in the Senate. Instead, Congress agreed upon yet another short-term SGR patch. On March 27, 2014, the House, under a suspension of normal rules, approved via a voice vote a one-year patch to the SGR that would avoid a 24.4 percent reduction to Medicare’s Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) slated to take effect April 1, 2014 (replacing it with a 0.5 percent increase to the PFS for 12 months). Then on March 31, the Senate approved the patch via a roll-call vote, and President Barack Obama signed the bill into law that same day.
Why did the efforts to pass a permanent doc fix fail? The aforementioned bipartisan and bicameral support of SGR reform proposals was limited to “policy,” i.e., the future system by which physicians will be reimbursed by Medicare. Congressional Democrats and Republicans did not see eye to eye on the so-called “pay-fors” that would offset the increased government spending that would result with repeal of the SGR and allow the reform legislation to be deficit-neutral.
Guest post by Ken Perez, vice president of healthcare policy, Omnicell.
Years ago, I worked in a business unit of a large technology company that was involved in mergers, acquisitions and partnerships. In the course of our work, even when some proposed deals would fall through and some partnerships would not come together, the strategic intent of the company remained clear to us. It was like a beacon that we kept pursuing no matter what.
With healthcare-related legislation, all too often we can lose sight of the strategic intent of CMS. We immerse ourselves in the debate over details, but often fail to step back and reflect on the “end game” that one can hang their hat on. What is CMS signaling to healthcare providers?
Currently, there is bipartisan and bicameral support for permanent repeal of the unpopular, annually overridden sustainable growth rate (SGR) provision, a formulaic approach intended to restrain the growth of Medicare spending on physician services. The SGR threatens to impose a 24.4 percent reduction to the Medicare physician fee schedule (PFS) effective April 1, 2014.
Lawmakers from the House Ways and Means, House Energy and Commerce, and Senate Finance committees have worked together to consolidate separate bills that their respective committees passed toward the end of 2013. The result is H.R. 4015, the SGR Repeal and Medicare Provider Payment Modernization Act of 2014, which was introduced by Rep. Michael C. Burgess, a Texas Republican and physician on Jan. 6, 2014.
This is the time of year for speculation regarding which teams will play in the various college football bowl games, but also, unfortunately, whether Congress will finally pass a permanent repeal of the unpopular Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate, which once again threatens to impose a sharp decrease to the physician fee schedule, reportedly 24.4 percent on Jan. 1, 2014.
Just as most every college football team had a sense of optimism when the season began, throughout the summer and fall it seemed like politicians on both sides of the aisle were, to switch metaphors, singing from the same hymnal, railing against the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate and arguing for a permanent “doc fix.” And, of course, physician groups provided supportive background vocals.
But here’s the problem: A permanent solution will be costly, very costly. According to the latest estimate by the Congressional Budget Office (from May), freezing (i.e., holding flat) all Medicare physician rates for 10 years would cost $139 billion, and proposals that are more generous to physicians would obviously cost more. The Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate remains the elephant in the room of deficit reduction. As for temporary patches, I’ve seen ballpark estimates of $18 billion for a one-year doc fix and $36 billion for a two-year freezing of rates, but both of those solutions would simply “kick the can down the road” yet again.
In mid-September, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the cost of H.R. 2810, a permanent Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) repeal or “doc fix,” would be $175.5 billion from 2014 through 2023, up from the CBO’s estimates of $139.1 billion in May and $138 billion in February for freezing (i.e., holding flat) all Medicare physician rates for 10 years.
H.R. 2810 would be more costly, as it does not freeze rates, it raises them slightly. As with all other SGR reform bills, its implementation would avoid an estimated 24.4 percent reduction to Medicare physician payment rates that is scheduled to take effect Jan. 1, 2014, but the bill would also increase payment rates by 0.5 percent per year during 2014-2018. That change would increase federal spending by $63.5 billion through 2018, relative to the spending projection under the SGR.
Guest post by Ken Perez, healthcare policy and IT consultant.
When he was leaving his post as the head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Dr. Donald M. Berwick famously said that 20 percent to 30 percent of healthcare spending is waste that yields no benefit to patients.
Given that large amount of waste, surely then, one would have thought that almost all of the original 32 Pioneer ACOs—many of which are generally considered the most sophisticated healthcare organizations in the nation—should have been able to shave a few percentage points off their costs during their first year in the program and therefore, meet or beat their expenditure benchmarks.
As we know from a July 16 press release from CMS, that was not what happened. While all of the Pioneer ACOs successfully reported the required quality measures, a majority—60 percent failed to produce shared savings, missing their cost-reduction (or more accurately, cost curve bending) targets. Moreover, two of the pioneers incurred sufficiently large losses requiring penalty payments to CMS.
Guest post by Ken Perez, healthcare policy and IT consultant.
Don’t say we had no warning. In late February of this year, 30 of the 32 Pioneer ACOs sent a letter to CMS that expressed concern about the program’s quality benchmarks and requested reporting-based, as opposed to performance-based, payments for performance year 2013.
On July 16, CMS shared the results of the first year of the Pioneer ACO program, which were rather checkered. On the positive side, all 32 Pioneer ACOs successfully reported the required quality measures, and costs for the more than 669,000 Medicare beneficiaries in Pioneer ACOs grew by 0.3 percent in 2012 versus 0.8 percent for similar beneficiaries in the same year.
Guest post by Ken Perez, Director of Healthcare Policy and Senior Vice President of Marketing, MedeAnalytics, Inc.
Recently, Mitch Seavey, 53, became the oldest winner of the Iditarod, the most famous dog sledding race in the world. At a distance of 1,600 kilometers, the Iditarod constitutes a race of supreme endurance. In dog sledding, the dogs that are chosen to lead the sled are usually the smartest, as well as the fastest, and they are appropriately called lead dogs.
The lead dogs in the realm of Medicare ACOs are the 32 pioneer ACOs, the selection of which was announced in December 2011 with great fanfare and optimism. With the greater risks (and rewards) of the pioneer ACO Model, the pioneers were widely considered the best and the brightest, the organizations most likely to succeed as ACOs.
Thanks to Ken Perez, senior vice president of marketing and director of healthcare policy at MedeAnalytics, for forwarding me the following very concise, yet detailed information about the sequester and its impact on healthcare from a white paper he drafted on the subject.
For those of you wanting to know more about how the sequestration came to be and the purpose for the reduction in spending over the next 10 years, Perez and MedeAnalytics do a great job describing the reasoning for it and its potential impact to the healthcare community in “The Sequester: Analysis of Its Impact on Healthcare.”
Thanks, Ken, for offering us a nonpartisan view of the sequester. We appreciate the objectivity to what’s become a very subjective debate. If after reviewing the following information and you have any questions or comments, leave them in the comment section. If they are for Perez, I’ll make sure he gets them and can respond.
Background of the Sequester
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) was the compromise legislative solution that enabled the United States to get through the debt crisis of the summer of 2011. The act was passed by the House of Representatives on Aug. 1, 2011, by a vote of 269-161, and by the Senate on the following day by a vote of 74-26. The BCA was signed into law by President Barack Obama on Aug. 2, 2011 as Public Law 112-25.
The intent of the BCA was to rein in long-term federal spending and raise the debt ceiling. To those ends, it put in motion $917 billion in cuts to discretionary spending (excluding Medicare) over 10 years and raised the debt ceiling by $900 billion.
In addition, the BCA created a 12-member Joint Committee of Congress (also known as the “Super Committee”) to produce proposed legislation that would reduce the deficit by at least $1.5 trillion over 10 years.
The act mandated a sequestration process (or sequester) that would be triggered if the Joint Committee was unable to agree upon a proposal with at least $1.2 trillion in spending cuts. Ultimately, to no one’s surprise, the Joint Committee failed to reach an agreement, and the sequestration process was triggered. Per the sequester: 1) The President could request a debt limit increase of up to $1.2 trillion; and 2) across-the-board cuts equal to the debt limit increase would apply to both mandatory and discretionary programs, with total reductions split equally between defense and non-defense functions.
The across-the-board spending cuts would be implemented from FY 2013 through FY 2021, a period of nine years, and apply to both mandatory and discretionary programs. The cut to Medicare would be capped at two percent and limited to cuts to provider payments.
Exempt from the cuts were Medicaid, welfare programs (e.g., food stamps), and other low-income subsidies, as well as Social Security, veterans’ benefits, civilian and military retirement, and net interest payments.
What would be the annual reduction by function of the sequester? Per Table 1, starting with the total reduction of $1.2 trillion to be applied over the nine-year period, a specified 18 percent for debt service savings is deducted, and then the result is divided by nine to arrive at the annual reduction of $109.3 billion for each year for FY 2013 through FY 2021. In every year, the annual reduction is split evenly between defense and non-defense functions, resulting in a $54.7 billion reduction for each function.
The Impact on Medicare of the Original Sequester
According to a September 2012 report from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the sequester would pare Medicare in FY 2013 by $11.8 billion, with the following distribution of the cuts:
Medicare Part A: $5.8 billion
Medicare Part B: $5.2 billion
Medicare Part D: $0.6 billion
Sundry (including affordable insurance exchange grants, program management, state grants and demonstrations, and fraud and abuse control): $0.2 billion
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012
In early January 2013, Congress averted the so-called “fiscal cliff” by passing the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Public Law 112-240, which, among many things, pushed out the implementation of the sequester until March 1, 2013, reducing the total cut for FY 2013 by $24 billion or 22 percent to $85.3 billion.
The Enactment of the Revised Sequester and Its Impact on Healthcare
Through March 1, 2013, President Obama and congressional leaders were unable to reach an agreement to avert the automatic spending cuts of the revised sequester.
According to the Congressional Budget Office and per Table 2, for FY 2013, the total cut of $85.3 billion includes $42.7 billion in cuts to defense, $9.9 billion in cuts to Medicare, and $32.8 billion in cuts to other non-defense programs.
Medicare accounts for 12 percent of the total cut and 23 percent of the nondefense portion. How might the $9.9 billion in cuts to Medicare be allocated? In the absence of further guidance from the OMB, a reasonable approach would be to apply the same proportions as the aforementioned September 2012 OMB report. This would yield the allocation reflected in Table 3, with Medicare Parts A and B sustaining the lion’s share of the cuts.
Medicare Part A could be cut by $4.9 billion, which could include an estimated $3.1 billion cut to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS). This cut to the IPPS would translate into an estimated $0.9 million reduction in Medicare reimbursement for the average hospital.
Medicare Part B could be cut by $4.4 billion, which could include an estimated $1.7 billion cut to physician payments and a $0.7 billion cut to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS).
According to the rule for sequestration, reductions in Medicare will begin in the month after the sequestration order is issued, i.e., April 2013, thereby delaying some of the effect on outlays until the ensuing fiscal year. Thus, for the federal government’s FY 2013, which ends September 30, 2013, the following could be the actual cuts:
IPPS: $1.55 billion
Physician payments: $0.85 billion
OPPS: $0.35 billion
The sequester clearly affects healthcare providers in FY 2013 in a material way. Unless it is repealed by Congress, the BCA — with its annual $109.3 billion sequester cuts for each of the next eight years — will raise the specter of two-percent funding reductions for hospitals and physicians on a yearly basis.
Because of the significance of healthcare to the federal budget and the nation’s economy, the broader philosophical and fiscal debate between the two political parties on what is the best way to reduce the deficit and engender economic growth will continue to impact the reimbursement rate-setting process.